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TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNGA](#) [UNSC](#) [RS](#) [GG](#)
SUBJECT: QUINT POLITICAL DIRECTORS SEPTEMBER 26 MEETING
WITH EU SPECIAL ENVOY PIERRE MOREL

Classified By: EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Quint Political Directors (U.S., France, Germany, UK, and Italy) met on September 26 with EU Special Envoy for Georgia Pierre Morel to discuss the October 15 Geneva talks on Georgia. Morel presented his vision of the talks proceeding along two tracks: a plenary session that is convened bi-monthly at the Political Director level; and expert-level working groups convened on an ad hoc basis dealing with security/stability issues, human rights, and IDP/refugee returns. Morel planned to invite de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders to Geneva for the inauguration of the working groups on October 22, but did not foresee their attendance at the opening session of the talks on October 15. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) Participants: EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, French Political Director Gerard Araud, German Political Director Volker Stanzel, UK Political Director Mark Lyall Grant, Italian Political Director Sandro de Bernadin, EUR/CARC Conflicts Advisor Mike Carpenter (notetaker).

The Geneva Talks

¶3. (C) Morel began by telling the Quint that he intends to meet with the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) on September 29 in Brussels, fly to Tbilisi on September 30, visit Gori on October 1, and then fly to Yerevan to see Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on October 2 (due to Lavrov's longstanding commitment to be in Yerevan on that date). Morel said it was essential to consult with Russia in the lead-up to the Geneva talks or Russia will not play a cooperative role. In Georgia, he argued there is an urgent need to establish an "incident prevention mechanism" that would immediately investigate and de-escalate tensions in the zones of conflict. There would be one mechanism for Abkhazia and one for South Ossetia. This sort of mechanism is urgently needed since recent incidents of violence could spiral out of control and give Russia a pretext to slow its implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

¶4. (C) French Political Director Gerard Araud noted Russia is interested in having a real dialogue in Geneva, and that the EU Foreign Ministers had agreed with Secretary Rice to start this dialogue at the Political Directors' level. Araud told the Quint that on the eve of the talks (i.e. October 14), French Foreign Minister Kouchner would host a dinner for the three international organizations active in post-conflict Georgia: the UN, OSCE, and EU. The guests would include UN Secretary general Ban Ki Moon and UN Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, Finnish Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairman-in-Office Alexander Stubb and OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, and EU High Representative Javier Solana (in addition to Kouchner). The October 15 talks themselves would include the representatives of the EU (Morel), OSCE, and UN (Special Representative of the Secretary General Johan Verbeke), in addition to the MFA

Political Directors of Georgia, Russia, and the U.S. This would constitute the "Group of Six" who participate in the plenary session in Geneva.

15. (C) Morel responded that he envisioned two "launching sessions" of the Geneva talks. The first "launching session" would be the plenary session held on October 15 at the Political Director level. The Abkhaz and South Ossetians would not/not be invited to this session. A second "launching session" would occur a week later (approximately October 22) at the expert level, and would include the de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders. The Political Directors would meet every two weeks and the experts would meet as often as needed, reporting to the Political Directors at the bi-monthly "plenary sessions." The expert-level meetings would be broken down into two Working Groups: one on the return of refugees and IDPs (and human rights), and the other on security and stability. When needed, the talks could be elevated to the ministerial level. A good opportunity for a ministerial meeting would be in conjunction with the OSCE ministerial conference in Helsinki on December 4-5.

16. (C) UK Political Director Lyall Grant supported Morel's decision not to invite the de facto leaders to the plenary session on October 15. Araud and German Political Director Stanzel were more skeptical about delaying de facto

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participation until October 22. Lyall Grant noted that the working groups could also include relevant organizations such as UNHCR and ICRC. Morel agreed, and noted that the talks will take place at the EU Mission to the UN in Geneva, and invitations will be sent to the appropriate missions in Geneva. The presence of the OSCE, UN, and EU in Georgia will together constitute the "international mechanism" in point 5 of the six-point French-mediated ceasefire agreement of August 12. A/S Fried told the group that having the de facto leaders participate only in the second meeting will be a tough sell with Russia. Georgia will probably accept it if pro-Georgian South Ossetian leader Dmitri Sanakoyev is also invited.

Arria-style meeting with separatist leaders in New York

17. (C) Araud raised the issue of an Arria-style (informal) meeting at the UN in New York with the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Referring to a Russian proposal to allow for an Arria-style meeting to take place in New York in return for a technical rollover of UNOMIG's mandate and the exclusion of Georgian representatives from the Security Council session on the renewal, Araud asked the Quint whether they believed an Arria-style meeting was an acceptable price to pay for technical rollover of UNOMIG's mandate? Furthermore, was it necessary to rename UNOMIG, as the Abkhaz were demanding? Morel noted that the Quint had a collective interest in keeping the "international mechanism" (UN, EU, OSCE) in Georgia intact, with UNOMIG playing the lead role in Abkhazia. A/S Fried noted that Secretary Rice had told Lavrov that renaming UNOMIG is a deal-breaker. Fried said he would go back to Washington and see where we stand on the Arria-style meeting. If we were to theoretically agree to an Arria-style meeting in return for a rollover of UNOMIG's mandate, we should host a separate Arria-style meeting with Sanakoyev and representatives of the IDP population in Georgia.
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